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NOTES
Negligence: Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club:
A Balanced Approach to Vendor Liability and Underage
Drinking
I. Introduction
The automobile is a constant reminder of a changed and changing
America. It has made a tremendous impact on every segment of
society, including the field ofjurisprudence. In the "horseand buggy"
days the common law may not have been significantly affected by the
sale of liquor to an intoxicated person. The common law of
nonliability was satisfactory. With today's car of steel and speed it
becomes a lethal weapon in the hands of a drunken imbiber. The frequency of accidents involving drunk drivers are commonplace. Its
affliction of bodily injury to an unsuspectingpublic is also of common
knowledge. Undersuch circumstances we are compelled to widen the
scope of the common law.'
On June 7, 1994, in Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club,2 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court determined that a minor could bring a valid cause of action against
a commercial alcohol vendor? Specifically, the court found that where a minor is
injured as the result of vendor negligence, after consuming beer purchased from the
vendor, the minor may have a cause of action against the vendor This result was
the latest in a line of cases describing dram shop liability in Oklahoma.5
This note will examine the requirements of a valid negligence action against
commercial alcohol vendors and the extension of liability to protect minor consumers
who suffer injuries as a result of their own alcohol-induced actions. First, the status
of the law prior to the Busby decision will be summarized. Second, the facts of the
case will be provided, supplemented by an analysis of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
opinion. Third, the consequences of the newly defined cause of action will be
reviewed. Finally, the decision will be evaluated to determine its consistency with
legal precedent and public policy.

1. Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 725 P.2d 300, 304 (Okla. 1986).
2. 885 P.2d 1326 (Okla. 1994).
3. Id.; see also Mansfield v. Circle K. Corp., 877 P.2d 1130 (Okla. 1994) (involving substantially
the same issue except that the minor purchased beer for consumption off the premises of the vendor).
4. Busby, at 1326.
5. See Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Todd, 813 P.2d 508 (Okla. 1991); Sanders v. Crosstown Mkt., Inc., 850 P.2d 1061 (Okla. 1993);
Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc., 854 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1993).
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II. Law Priorto the Case
A. Dram Shop Liability in Oklahoma Priorto Brigance
6
Prior to 1986, no law addressed the subject of dram shop liability in Oklahoma.

Originally, Oklahoma enacted a dram shop statute in 1910 which imposed civil

liability upon servers of alcoholic beverages. 7 This statute was replaced in 1959 by
the Oklahoma Alcohol Beverage Control Act.8 The new act did not provide for civil

liability. Thus, Oklahoma courts were left without any legislative guidance regarding
vendor liability. In addition, following the repeal of the dram shop statute, the

Oklahoma Supreme Court had no occasion to consider vendor liability issues, leaving
the courts bereft of judicial guidance on the subject As a result, prior to Brigance
v. Velvet Dove Restaurant,0 the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that the State
of Oklahoma followed the traditional common law with regard to dram shop
liability."
At common law, a tavern owner (commercial vendor) who served alcoholic
beverages was not liable for a third person's injuries caused by an intoxicated
3
patron." This rule was based principally upon concepts of causation. As a matter
of law, voluntary consumption of alcohol by the intoxicated patron was designated
as the proximate cause of the third party's injuries, not the sale of liquor by the
vendor. 4 Because consumption of alcohol, not its sale, was the proximate cause of
any injuries, the vendor could not be held legally liable for negligence. This

6. Oklahoma has no reported cases prior to Brigance.
7. Prohibition Act, ch. 69, art. III, § 21, 1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 594, 610-11 (codified at 37
OKLA. STAT. § 121 (1951)) (repealed 1959). Title 37, § 121 provided:
Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person who shall be injured in
person or property, or means of support by any intoxicated person or in consequence of
intoxication of any person, shall have a right of action for all damages actually sustained,
in his or her own name against any person, individual or corporate, who shall by selling,
bartering, giving away, or otherwise furnishing intoxicating liquors, contrary to the
provisions of this chapter, have caused the intoxication of such person. On the trial of any
such suit, proof that the defendant, or defendants sold, bartered, gave away, or furnished
any such liquors to such intoxicated person on the day, or about the time (and prior
thereto) of such i-jury, shall be prima facie evidence that the liquor so sold, bartered,
given away, or otherwise furnished, caused such intoxication. In any action by a married
woman, or other person legally entitled to recover damages for loss of support, caused by
such intoxication, it shall only be necessary to prove that the defendant, or defendants, has
or have given, bartered, sold or otherwise furnished intoxicating liquor of any kind to such
person, during the period when such cause of action shall have accrued.
37 OKLA. STAT. § 121 (1951).
8. 37 OKLA. STAT. § 501 (Supp. 1959).
9. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302.
10. 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986).
11. Id. at 302.
see, e.g., Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (Il1. 1889) (explaining the common law doctrine
12. Id.;
of nonliability).
13. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302.
14. Id.
15. Id. The elements of common law negligence in Oklahoma have been summarized as "(1) the
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traditional rule was first abandoned by New Jersey in 1959. Since then, most states
have abandoned the antiquated common law rule. 7 Oklahoma joined this emerging
trend in Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant.
B. The Origin of Modem Dram Shop Liability: Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant
On July 8, 1986, commercial alcohol vendor liability in Oklahoma changed
dramatically." The change evolved from the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision
in Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant." In Brigance, the parents of a minor
brought an action against an alcohol vendor, its president, and an employee. The
parents alleged that the employee of the Velvet Dove Restaurant (Velvet Dove)
served intoxicating beverages to a group of minors. Among the minors served was
the individual who drove the group to the restaurant. This individual was known by
the Velvet Dove employee to be the driver because the employee assisted the driver
to his car upon the group's departure. The parents further alleged that the beverages
served by the Velvet Dove caused the driver to become intoxicated or increased his
prior intoxication, thereby causing a one-car accident wherein the minor-plaintiff was
injured.
The trial court dismissed the negligence suit for failure to state a cause of action.'
The trial court based its decision on the traditional common law rule.2' The
Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that a person injured by
an intoxicated person has a valid negligence claim against the commercial vendor

existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to protect plaintiff from injury; (2) a violation of that
duty; and (3) injury proximately resulting therefrom." Sloan v. Owen, 579 P.2d 812, 814 (Okla. 1977).
16. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1,8 (N.J. 1959) (holding that emergence of automobile as
prevalent form of transportation made the risk of injury foreseeable).
17. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302; see, e.g., Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983); MichnikZilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. 1983); Campbell v. Carpenter, 566 P.2d 893
(Or. 1977); Pfeifer v. Copperstone Restaurant & Lounge, 693 P.2d 644 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Sorensen
v. Jarvis, 350 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1984). See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 104, at 718-19 (5th ed. 1984).
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Ling v. Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 703 P.2d 731
(1985), revealed just how strong the trend [toward abandonment of the traditional rule]
was in the appendix to its opinion. It reported that fourteen states had dram shop statutes
that gave a right of action to persons injured in person, property, or means of support, by
an intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication of any person, against the
person selling or furnishing the liquor that caused the intoxication in whole or in part.
That court further reported that twenty-nine jurisdictions, including the District of
Columbia, had judicially abrogated the common law doctrine of no liability, and that six
states with dram shop laws had judicially imposed liability in some form. Only six states
had no dram shop laws and refused to impose liability judicially.
Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc., 854 P.2d 910, 912 (Okla. 1993).
18. Commercial vendor liability should be distinguished from "social host" liability. Courts have
traditionally treated "social hosts" with greater leniency because they are not state licensed alcohol
vendors who sell or serve alcohol for profit. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 306.
19. 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986).
20. Id. at 301.
21. Il See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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who served alcohol to the intoxicated person for on-premises consumption.22 In
addition to creating dram shop liability, the result announced by the Brigance court
is significant for three specific reasons. First, the Brigance court examined its judicial
authority and determined that it had both the right and responsibility to create dram
shop liability. Second, the Brigance court held that commercial vendors owed
innocent third parties a duty to refrain from serving noticeably intoxicated patrons.'
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Brigance court refused to apply the
common law rule wherein the voluntary consumption of alcohol, rather than its sale
or service, is considered as the proximate cause of injuries resulting from the actions
of an intoxicated person'
By the time of the Brigance decision, many states had retreated from the
traditional common law rule concerning vendor liability' Oklahoma, however, had
no dram shop statute., nor had Oklahoma courts considered the issue.27 Thus, before
reaching a decision, the court in Brigance was forced to consider its role in the
creation and interpretation of tort law. The Brigance court stated that it considered
the common law "a dynamic and growing thing [whose] rules arise from the
application of reason to the changing condition of society."' Therefore, the
Brigance court found the development of tort law to be "peculiarly a function of the
judiciary."' In addition, the Brigance court noted that "because duty and liability
are matters of public policy they are subject to the changing attitudes and needs of
society."" For these reasons, the Brigance court believed it was authorized to
abrogate the traditional common law in favor of a new rule."
In reaching its conclusion, the Brigance court addressed two specific assertions of
the vendor concerning this issue. In response to an assertion that the legislature had
expressly spoken on the subject by repealing the dram shop act and by failing to
enact a replacement, the Brigance court concluded that statutory silence was not
indicative of legislative intent. 2 In response to a second assertion that the area of
law would be better dealt with by the legislature, the Brigance court acknowledged
the "clear trend" otherwise on the subject and cited an earlier opinion wherein the
court modified the common law doctrine of governmental immunity?3 Operating

22. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304.
23. Id. at 303.
24. 1d at 304.
25. Id at 305.
26. Id. at 302. See supra note 17.
27. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
28. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 303 (quoting McCormack v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740
(Okla. 1980)); see also Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Okla.1983).
29. Brigance, 725 P 2d at 303.
30. Id.; see Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756, 761 (D. Alaska 1973).
31. Brigance, 725 P2d at 304.
32. Id.at 303.
33. Id.In that earlier opinion, Vanderpool v. State, the court stated:
But having come to the conclusions that the judicially recognized doctrine of governmental immunity in its present state under the case law is no longer supportable in reason,
justice or in light of the overwhelming trend against its recognition, our duty is clear.
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under this interpretation of its authority, the Brigance court modified the traditional
rule and created a cause of action against negligent alcohol vendors for injured third
parties.'
In order to create a cause of action against commercial vendors under the Brigance
facts, the court had to find a duty to the injured third party.3 Thus, the Brigance
court determined that a commercial vendor who sells intoxicating beverages for onpremises consumption has a duty to exercise reasonable care not to sell liquor to a
noticeably intoxicated person. 6 The Brigance court premised this duty on the
expectation that a commercial vendor who sells alcohol to an intoxicated person
should foresee the "unreasonable risk of harm to others who may be injured by such
person's impaired ability to operate an automobile."37 Therefore, the Brigance court
recognized a duty upon a commercial vendor for on-premises consumption "to
exercise reasonable care in selling or furnishing liquor to persons who by previous
intoxication may lack full capacity of self-control to operate a motor vehicle and who
may subsequently injure a third party."3
The Brigance court recognized a vendor's duty to third parties and clearly noted
that the duty was imposed by both statute and common law principles.39 Specifically, the court stated that the breach of duty for which it was imposing civil liability
constituted a public offense under the Oklahoma Statutes.' The Brigance court also
4
explained that there was a common law duty to exercise ordinary care. ' The
common law duty to third parties was in accordance with the general rules expressed
in Restatement (Second) of Torts 2

Where the reason for the rule no longer exists, that alone should toll its death knell.
Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Okla. 1983).
34. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304.
35. See supra note 15.
36. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 37 OKLA. STAT. § 537 (Supp. 1985). The statute provides in pertinent part: "(A) No person
shall: (1) Knowingly sell, deliver, or furnish alcoholic beverages to any person under twenty-one (21)
years of age; (2) Sell, deliver or knowingly furnish alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person or to
any person who has been adjudged insane or mentally deficient." Id.
41. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304; see Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); Rappaport v.
Nichols, 156 A.2d I (N.J. 1959).
42. Section 308 of the Restatement provides:
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity which
is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person
intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner
as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
RESTATEiENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965). Section 390 provides:
One who supplies ... a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has
reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience or otherwise to use it in
a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others . . . is
subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.
Id. § 390.
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Having established that a duty to third parties existed, the final issue faced by the
Brigance court was causation 3 Under the traditional common law, even if the
vendor breached a duty to third parties injured by an intoxicated patron, the vendor
was not legally liable because he was not considered the proximate cause of the
injuries.' In other words, the chain of legal causation between the negligent selling
of the alcoholic beverage and the injury was considered to be broken by the
voluntary act of the patron in consuming the alcohol.4
In Brigance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court removed this impediment to recovery.
Specifically, the court held that voluntary consumption and any resulting intoxication
and/or impairment which results in a third party injury constitutes merely a
foreseeable intervening cause as opposed to a supervening cause. Thus, the
Brigance court held that a jury could find that the vendor could have reasonably
foreseen and anticipated the possible consequences of selling alcoholic beverages to
a noticeably intoxicated patron who intended to drive an automobile and that the sale
may have been the proximate cause of the alleged injuries.47
C. No Duty Owed to Adults Who Voluntarily Consume: Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Todd
In Brigance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court established its authority to change the
common law, recognized a duty owed by commercial vendors to third parties injured
by intoxicated patrons, and abolished the historical impediments to proving
causation.' In Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd,49 a bar patron sought to extend
Brigance to allow him to recover from the vendor for alcohol-induced, self-inflicted
injuries allegedly suffered because the vendor served the patron after he was already
intoxicated.
In Todd, the patroa was injured in a one-car accident after having been served
alcohol in Todd's Tavern (the Tavern). Ohio Casualty Insurance Company instituted
an action for a declaratory judgment as to its duty to defend and indemnify Todd in
the matter. Thereafter, the patron filed a cross-claim against the Tavern alleging that
employees of the Tavern served him alcohol while he was noticeably intoxicated.
Because serving alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated person is a violation of Oklahoma

43. In addition to showing duty and breach of duty, the plaintiff must establish that the alcohol was
the proximate cause of the injuries suffered. See supranote 15.
44. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305 (Okla. 1986).
45. Id.; see, e.g., Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 206 (Ariz. 1983).
46. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305. An intervening cause which will break the causal nexus between the
vendor's negligence and the resulting injury is called a supervening cause. In Oklahoma, the test to
determine whether a caus- is supervening is whether it is: "(1) independent of the original act, (2)
adequate of itself to bring about the result and (3)one whose occurrence was not reasonably foreseeable."
Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., 652 P.2d 260, 264 (Okla. 1982); see also Rappaport v. Nichols, 156
A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 1959) (holding that intoxicated patron's drunk driving could have reasonably been
foreseen and that consequently there was no breach in the chain of causation).
47. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 305.
48. Id. at 304-05.
49. 813 P.2d 508 (Okla. 1991).
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law,' the patron claimed that the Tavern's employees were negligent per se, entitling
him to recover damages.
In order for the patron to recover on his negligence claim against the Tavern, the
patron was required to show that the Tavern's employees owed him a duty of care
which was breached." This was the critical issue to which the Todd court devoted
its attention. Before ultimately holding that the patron did not have a valid cause of
action, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered whether the patron had an actionable
negligence per se claim or an actionable negligence claim."
The patron's negligence per se claim was premised on the statutory duty allegedly
breached when the Tavern employees served him despite his intoxicated state. 3 To
recover for negligence per se, "(1) the injury must have been caused by the violation,
(2) the injury must be of a type intended to be prevented by the ordinance, and (3)
the injured party must be one of the class intended to be protected by the statute."'
In examining the patron's claim, the Todd court determined that the third element was
missing. 55 Specifically, the Todd court noted that in Brigance it declared that the
purpose behind section 537(A)(2) was to protect innocent third parties who were
injured by intoxicated persons.56 The Todd court found nothing in either section 537
or other statutes regulating alcohol that indicated legislative intent to protect the
"intoxicated adult who, by his own actions, cause[d] injury to himself."' In fact, the
Todd court interpreted legislative intent to protect only the 'unsuspecting public' in effect all of the populace except the willing imbiber."58 On this basis, the Todd
court determined that a violation of section 537(A)(2) did not constitute negligence
per se.59
Upon determining that the patron could not maintain an action based on negligence
per se, the Todd court examined whether a commercial vendor had a duty to an
intoxicated adult customer who injured himself. If such a duty existed, the patron
would have a viable negligence claim. However, the Todd court held that a
commercial vendor owes no duty to an adult customer who voluntarily consumes
intoxicants and is injured.'
50. Id. See supra note 40.
51. Todd, 813 P.2d at 510.

52. Id. at 509.
53. Id. See supra note 38.
54.
Natural
55.
56.

See, e.g., Hampton v. Hammons, 743 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Okla. 1987); Boyles v. Oklahoma
Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613, 618 (Okla. 1980).
Todd, 813 P.2d at 510.
Id.; see Cuevas v. Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 348 (Miss. 1986) (holding that an

intoxicated person was excluded from the class of persons meant to be protected by a similar state
statute). In making this determination, the court pointed out the class to be protected was the general

public, and that this class, while broad in range, could not be said to include "an adult individual...
who voluntarily consumes intoxicants and then, by reason of his inebriated condition, injures himself."
Todd, 813 P.2d at 510.
57. Todd, 813 P.2d at 510.
58. Id.; see, e.g., Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 725 P.2d 300, 304 (Okla. 1986); see also
Bertelmann v. Taas Assocs., 735 P.2d 930, 934 (Haw. 1987).
59. Todd, 813 P.2d at 510.
60. Id. at 511. Justice Opala, in his concurring opinion, explains that the causal barrier to recovery
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In considering whether to extend Brigance to protect an inebriated adult customer,
the Todd court identified four distinct reasons not to recognize a broader duty of
care.61 First, the Todd court considered precedent from other jurisdictions. A review
of other states indicated that the majority of them refused to create a cause of action
for an inebriated adult.62 In fact, other jurisdictions had generally concluded that as
a matter of public policy, drunken persons who harm themselves are responsible for
their condition and should not be able to recover damages for their injuries.' A
judicially created cau;e of action against a commercial vendor would only reward the
inebriate for his own immoderation.' Second, the Todd court examined the
treatment of intoxication by other areas of the law. In its examination, the Todd court
found that in no other situation does the law similarly excuse one's failure to act
responsibly." For example, a defendant in a criminal trial is held accountable for
his acts of criminal behavior committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication.'
Likewise, Workers' Compensation law will not cover an employee's injury which
results from the intoxication of the injured employee.67 Third, the Todd court
evaluated the practical effects of its decision. Specifically, the Todd court contemplated the vast number of claims that might be brought by injured drunks "if they
were entitled to eveiy expense and injury that are natural concomitants of their
intoxication."' Fourth, and finally, the Todd court noted that other methods of
punishment existed for violative vendors. Expanded civil liability was not a necessary
deterrent.
In response to a dissenting opinion, the Todd court indicated that its holding would
not ignore the conduct of the commercial vendor.' If a third party is injured,

removed by the court in Brigance is only removed where the court recognizes a duty of care. Thus, for
innocent third parties, the causal barrier is removed. However, the barrier is not removed for inebriated
adult customers. Id. at 513-14 (Opala, J. concurring).
61. Several strong dissents were offered by Justices Lavender, Kauger, and Wilson. Id. at 521, 524.
See also the Court's original holding in Todd which recognized a valid cause of action for adult
consumer-inebriates. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd, 61 OKLA. B.J. 3016 (1990). The case was reversed
upon rehearing seven months later. Todd, 813 P.2d 508 (Okla. 1991).
62. Todd, 813 P.2d at 511; see Coudriet v. Southland Corp., 198 Cal. App. 3d 849 (Ct. App. 1988);
Gregor v. Constitution Stte Ins., 534 So. 2d 1340 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Jackson v. PKM Corp., 422
N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1988); Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1989); Great
Central Ins. v. Tobias, 524 N.E.2d 168 (Ohio 1988); see also Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Liability of
PersonsFurnishingIntoxicating Liquorfor Injury to or Death of Consumer, Outside Coverage of Civil
DamageActs, 98 A.L.R.3,1 1230 (1980).
63. Todd, 813 P.2d at 511; see also Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554, 557 (Del. 1981); Bertelmann
v. Taas Assoc., 735 P.2d 930 (Haw. 1987).
64. Todd, 813 P.2d at 511. "To allow recovery in favor of one who has voluntarily procured a
quantity of liquor for his or her own consumption with full knowledge of its possible or probable results
'would savor too much of allowing... [the] person to benefit by his or her own wrongful act."' Allen
v. County of Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
65. Todd, 813 P.2d at.
512.
66. Id.; see 21 OKLA. STAT. § 153 (1991); Grayson v. State, 687 P.2d 747 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
67. Todd, 813 P.2d at 512.
68. Id.; see also Sager v. McClenden, 672 P.2d 697, 701 (Or. 1983).
69. Todd, 813 P.2d at 512; see Todd, 813 P.2d at 523 (Lavender, J. concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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Brigance provided a claim against the vendor." Furthermore, the commercial
vendor who disregards the condition of his customers does so at the risk of criminal
prosecution, as well as forfeiture of his liquor license."'
D. The Importance of Causation: Sanders v. Crosstown Market, Inc.
Following Brigance and Todd, dram shop liability required an injured party to state
a valid negligence or negligence per se claim.' To have a valid negligence per se
claim, it was imperative that the injured party be a member of the class the statute
intended to protect.' To state a valid negligence claim, the commercial vendor had
to owe the injured party a-duty of care7 4 Only where the court found a duty of care
would the traditional common law distinction regarding causation be defeated.75
Several years after Todd, in Sanders v. Crosstown Market, Inc.,76 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court'was required to determine whether a commercial vendor was liable
to an injured minor who became intoxicated on alcohol provided by a second minor
who had purchased it from the vendor.' After careful consideration, the court ruled
that the vendor was not liable to the injured minor. 8
In Sanders, a commercial vendor illegally sold beer to a minor. The purchasing
minor provided the beer to a second minor at a party. The second minor became
intoxicated and was injured in an automobile accident. The guardians of the second
minor then instituted an action against the commercial vendor. The trial court
dismissed the action but the appellate court reversed and remanded the case for
trial.' On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to extend its holding in
Brigance to cover the case."0
The injured minor in Sanders attempted to recover from the vendor on a claim of
negligence per se. The minor contended that the commercial vendor violated an
Oklahoma Statute which prohibited the sale of beer to minors.8 In considering the
claim, the Sanders court determined that although the statute was violated, the injured
minor was not within the class designed to be protected.' Curiously, the Sanders
70. Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986).
71. Id. See supra note 40.
72. Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Todd, 813 P.2d 508 (Okla. 1991).
73. Todd, 813 P.2d at 510.
74. Id. at 510; Brigance, 725 P.2d at 302.
75. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
76. 850 P.2d 1061 (Okla. 1993).

Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1063. Title 37, § 241 provides in material part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who holds a license to sell and dispense nonintoxicating beverages [including 3.2% beer] . . . to sell, barter, or give to any person under
twenty-one (21) years of age any beverage containing more than one-half of one percent
(1/2 of 1%) of alcohol measured by volume and not more than three and two-tenths
percent (3.2%) of alcohol measured by weight ....
37 OKLA. STAT. § 241 (Supp. 1985).
82. Sanders, 850 P.2d at 1063. A similar rationale can be found in Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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court premised this conclusion on the remoteness of the minor's injury from the
original sale of beer." This is curious for two reasons. First, both the purchaser and
plaintiff were minors, the specific class the statute was designed to protect. Second,
if the Sanders court believed there was an insufficient causal connection between the
minor's injury and the sale of beer,U such a finding would prevent successful proof
of causation, an element of negligence per se separate and distinct from membership
in the protected class. In other words, why find the injured minor outside the
protected class on the basis of an infirmity in a separate element, causation.
Evidence that the :Sanders court considered causation to be at issue is found in the
following statement: "Crosstown's employees had no obligation to anticipate that
Scott [purchaser] might give beer to Sanders, and that Sanders might get drunk, and
might drive under the influence of alcohol."' The statement indicates that the
Sanders court recognized that the injury to the plaintiff was not foreseeable to
Crosstown Market. Since foreseeability is an element of causation, this infirmity
would prevent a successful claim of either negligence or negligence per se.' The
Sanders court, however, held only that the remoteness of the injured minor's
connection to the vendor placed her outside the Brigance ruling, without further
explanation."
While the reasoning of the Oklahoma Supreme Court may not be extremely clear,
the outcome in Sanders emphasizes the continued importance attached to causation.
Even where the courts recognize a statutory or common law duty, causation is still
necessary for a valid negligence claim.
E. Vendor Liability Extended to Minors and Off Premises Consumption: Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc.
Tomlinson v. Loves Country Stores, Inc.88 discussed the question of whether to
expand the holding in Brigance to include liability against commercial vendors of
beer for consumption off the premises when the vendors sold to minors. In
Tomlinson, the commercial vendor sold beer to three minors, Brad Tomlinson, Jason
Budd, and Marcus Urias. At the time of the sale, the employees of the vendor knew
that the minors intended to drink the beer while driving in a motor vehicle. As a
result of being intoxicated, Budd, the driver, wrecked the vehicle. Tomlinson died
as a result of injuries sustained in the wreck. A claim was thereafter filed alleging
that the vendor was negligent in violating the statute prohibiting sale of beer to
minors. Upon defendant's motion, the complaint was dismissed by the trial court

813 P.2d 508, 510 (0kla. 1991).
83. Sanders, 850 P.2d at 1063.
84. Id. at 1064, 1065. (Wilson, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1064.
86. Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc., 854 P.2d 910, 916-17 (Okla. 1993). See infra notes
95-99 and accompanying text.
87. Sanders, 850 P.2d at 1064.
88. 854 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1993).
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because prior case law imposed liability only where the sale of alcohol was for
consumption on a vendor's premises. 9
After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that common law liability
extended to the sale of alcohol to minors for consumption off the premises of the
vendor. 0 In deciding to expand the rule enunciated in Brigance,the Tomlinson court
determined that the vendor owed the minors a duty of care. Specifically, the
Tomlinson court recognized that Oklahoma Statutes prohibited the sale of nonintoxicating beverages to minors.9 Without explicitly considering whether the claim
was valid as negligence per se, under which the minor must be in the class designed
to be protected, the Tomlinson court concluded that, "based upon the reasoning in
Brigance, the duty not to sell beer to persons under the age of twenty-one is
established."' Furthermore, the Tomlinson court declared that upon selling beer to
a minor, the vendor breached his duty, whether he sold the beer for consumption onpremises or off-premises. 3
Having recognized both a statutory and common law duty to minors in Tomlinson,94 the sole remaining issue was causation. Due to the nature of off the premises
consumption, the Tomlinson court reiterated the necessity of proving causation.'
Specifically, the Tomlinson court reaffirmed that
proximate cause must be the efficient cause that sets in motion the chain
of circumstances leading to an injury; if the negligence complained of
merely furnishes a condition by which the injury was made possible and
a subsequent independent act caused the injury, the existence of such
condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.'
In Oklahoma, foreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause.' Where an
injury is foreseeable as the result of a breach of duty, the breach constitutes
proximate cause." Only a supervening cause can then break the causal nexus
between the initial breach and the subsequent injury.99 In Tomlinson, the vendor sold
beer to minors for consumption off the premises. The sale breached both statutory
and common law duties. Because the employees of the vendor were aware that the
minors intended to drink the beer while driving or riding in their car, the resulting

89. Id.; see Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986).
90. Tomlinson, 854 P.2d at 915.
91. Id. Title 37, § 241 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, or give to any
person under twenty-one (21) years of age any nonintoxicating beverage, as defined in Section 163.2 of
this title." 37 OKLA. STAT. § 241 (1991).
92. Tomlinson, 854 P.2d at 915.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 916; see also Thur v. Dunkley, 474 P.2d 403, 405 (Okla. 1970); Green v. Sellers, 413 P.2d
522, 528 (Okla. 1966); Transport Indem. Co. v. Page, 406 P.2d 980, 986 (Okla. 1963).
97. Tomlinson, 854 P.2d at 916; see Atherton v. Devine, 602 P.2d 634, 636 (Okla. 1979).
98. Tomlinson, 854 P.2d at 916; see also Long v. Ponca City Hosp., 593 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Okla.
1979).
99. Tomlinson, 854 P.2d at 916. See supra note 46.
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injuries to the minor3 were foreseeable. Thus, absent a supervening cause, the breach
was the proximate cause of the accident.
F. The Status of the Law PrecedingBusby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club
The decision in Tomlinson broadened dram shop liability in Oklahoma. Essentially,
victims had two options for tort recovery. First, an injured party could bring a
negligence per se action against a commercial vendor." Such a claim would
require that the injured party be among the class the relevant .statute meant to
protect. 1 If so, a violation of the statute would suffice to show the existence and
breach of a duty to the party. Second, the injured party could bring a negligence
claim against the commercial vendor."° Under such circumstances, the party must
show that the vendor owed him a duty of care."° The Oklahoma Supreme Court
has recognized several such duties. A commercial vendor serving or selling alcohol
to patrons on the vendor's premises owes the entire "unsuspecting public" a duty not
to sell alcohol to an already intoxicated patron."M In addition, commercial vendors
owe to third parties the duty not to sell alcohol or beer to minors for on or off the
premises consumption." In recognizing these common law duties, the court
authorized negligence actions for their violation."
Once an injured party establishes duty and breach thereof, recovery is contingent
upon proof of cauation.' Historically, causation prevented recovery because
voluntary consumption of alcohol intervened to shift the legal cause of subsequent
injury to the person imbibing, not the alcohol vendor."9 While careful to note that
the historical impediment has not been uniformly abolished, the court in Sanders did
abrogate the rule in situations where it found the necessary duty to an injured
party. 0 9
Thus, following Tomlinson, judicially created dram shop liability in Oklahoma
required a successful plaintiff to clearly demonstrate the existence of a duty of care,
which when breached, caused the subsequent injuries."' Absent such a showing,
vendor liability was unavailable.
III. Statement of the Case: Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club
On July 22, 1990, Patricia Busby, an eighteen-year-old North Carolina resident,
attended a party at the Quail Creek Golf and Country Club (the Club). Those

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
1986).
107.
108.
109.
110.

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 73.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See supra note; 35-42 and accompanying text.
See supra note; 90-93 and accompanying text.
Tomlinson, 854 P.2d at 915; Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 725 P.2d 300, 304 (Okla.
See supra note; 43-47, 95-99 and accompanying text.
See supra note; 44-45 and accompanying text.
Sanders v. CrosStown Mkt., Inc., 850 P.2d 1061, 1062-63 (Okla. 1993).
Tomlinson, 854 P.2d at 916-17.
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attending the party were almost exclusively minors. Nevertheless, the party sponsors
contracted with the Club to provide food and beverages, including wine and beer.
Upon entering the party, the attendees were checked for identification. Attendees
over twenty-one were marked with an "X" on the back of their hand. Busby did not
receive an "X" upon entering. However, an unauthorized marker was passed around
and Busby may have received a mark on her hand in this manner.
Throughout the evening, beer and wine were served on open, unrestricted tables
in violation of Oklahoma Statutes."' Busby, also in violation of Oklahoma law,
consumed beer."2 After becoming intoxicated, with a blood alcohol level exceeding
0.21, Busby stepped backwards and fell over a second floor balcony railing to a
marble floor below.
As a result of injuries sustained in the fall, Busby filed a complaint against the
Club. Busby alleged that she was negligently served beer which resulted in her
injuries. In addition, she claimed that the Club was negligent per se for violating
local and state ordinances which prohibit serving alcohol to a minor. The Club filed
a motion for summary judgment and the district court certified the following question
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court:"3
May an 18-year-old person who consumed 3.2% beer on-premises state
a cause of action against the vendor for her subsequent on-premises
alcohol-related injuries, when both the vendor and purchaser presumably
violated the provisions of state law prohibiting the sale or purchase of
beer by or to persons under 21 years of age?" 4
The court answered in the affirmative."5
In considering the issue posed in Busby, the court revisited its holding in
Tomlinson."6 In Tomlinson, the court recognized a duty to third parties not to sell
beer to persons under the age of twenty-one." 7 Thus, precedent clearly established
that an injury to a third person caused by the sale of alcohol to a minor was actionable."' However, the Tomlinson court had not considered whether the duty would
extend to a minor who voluntarily consumed intoxicants and injured himself."9
In reaching its determination that vendors owe minors such a duty of care, the
Busby court examined both the views of other jurisdictions and Oklahoma's alcohol
statutes.'" Although a few jurisdictions maintain the common law rule of non-

Ill. See supra notes 81, 91.
112. Title 37, § 246(A) provides in pertinent part: "No person under twenty-one (21) years of age
shall (1) consume or (2) possess with the intent to consume nonintoxicating beverages, as defined in
Section 163.2 of this title, in any public place." 37 OKLA. STAT. § 246(A) (1991).
113. Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club, 885 P.2d 1326, 1327 (Okla. 1994).
114. Id. at 1326.
115. Id.
116. 854 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1993).
117. See id. at 915.
118. Id. at 910.
119. Id.
120. Busby, 885 P.2d at 1330.
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liability,' the majority of states allow a cause of action against a commercial
vendor.on behalf of a minor who voluntarily drinks to the point of intoxication and
is thereby injured." The states recognizing the cause of action have generally
concluded, as a matter of public policy, that minors as a class are incompetent, by
reason of their youth and inexperience, to deal responsibly with the effects of
alcohol." "The fact that minors violate statutes when purchasing or consuming
beer does not preclude a cause of action - because as between the seller and the
minor - it is the seller who is the responsible party in the action."'" Furthermore, the Busby court noted that in Oklahoma, the legislature has enacted statutes
which treat minors differently than adults with regard to alcohol. Those statutes,
which prohibit selling beer to minors"s and prohibit minors from possessing and
consuming beer," constitute legislative recognition of the foreseeable danger to
minors. Accordingly, the Busby court determined that the statutes were intended
7
to protect minors, thus rendering a statutory violation negligence per se.
While the Busby court recognized the right of intoxicated minors to recover from
commercial vendors for their injuries, it did not do so without limiting the breadth
of potential recoverizs.'" First, the Busby court held that under either common law
negligence or the negligence per se doctrine, a breach of duty regarding sale of
alcohol to a minor may be excused if the vendor can establish that the purchaser
appeared to be of age and that reasonable methods of identification were used to
ascertain the minor's age. 29 The court further noted that excusability is a fact
question for the jury. 3 ' Second, the Busby court noted that the jury will still be able
to apportion fault among the parties via comparative negligence.''
IV. Analysis
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country
Club extended the liability of commercial vendors when minors are negligently
served or sold alcohol.' 2 To properly evaluate the verdict, it should be examined
for both its practical effects and its consistency with legal precedent and public
policy.
121. Id.; see Winters v. Silver Fox Bar, 797 P.2d 51, 53-54 (Haw. 1990); Sheehy v. Big Flats
Community Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18, 21-22 (N.Y. 1989); Miller v. City of Portland, 604 P.2d 1261,
1265 (Or. 1980).
122. Busby, 885 P.2d at 1330; see Morris v. Farley Enters., 661 P.2d 167, 171 (Alaska 1983);
Brannigan v. Raybuck, 667 P.2d 213, 216-17 (Ariz. 1983); Bissett v. DMI, Inc., 717 P.2d 545, 547
(Mont. 1986); Anderson v. Moulder, 394 S.E.2d 61, 68 (NV.Va. 1990).
123. Busby, 885 P.2d at 1331.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1332. See supra notes 81, 91.
126. Busby, 885 P.2d at 1332. See supra note 112.
127. Busby, 885 P.2d at 1332.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1333; se.? Anderson v. Moulder, 394 S.E.2d 61, 68 (W.Va. 1990).
130. Busby, 885 P.2d at 1333.
131. Id. at 1334; see also 23 OKLA. STAT. § 13 (1991) (Oklahoma's comparative negligence statute).
132. Busby, 885 P.2d at 1327.
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As a practical result of the decision, it is questionable whether the ruling will
significantly increase commercial vendor liability. Although the case gives more
potential plaintiffs a cause of action against vendors, the effects on vendor
pocketbooks may be limited for two reasons. First, the majority of prudent, lawabiding vendors will be protected from increased suits by the provision regarding
excusability. Specifically, the vendor can rebut a prima facie case of negligence by
showing that the purchaser appeared to be of age and that the vendor used reasonable
means of identification to ascertain the minor's age."' If a jury refuses to excuse
the conduct of a vendor, it can still ameliorate the liability of the vendor by utilizing
the comparative negligence statute to allocate fault among the parties." It thus
seems likely that juries will be less tolerant of large awards to older minors when the
minor not only became voluntarily intoxicated but violated the law to do so. A
further practical benefit of the ruling is that commercial vendors will be strongly
encouraged by the threat of more lawsuits and the danger of large awards to obey the
law with less impunity. Certainly, stringent adherence to customer age verification
programs would almost preclude the vendor from future dram shop liability for
alcohol sales to minors. However, it must be remembered that the burden of proof
for excusability falls upon the vendor.
One potential problem with the practical results of the decision will be the
occasional case involving a sympathetic client. Mansfiel v. Circle K Corp.3S is
M

a perfect example. In Mansfield, the twenty-year-old plaintiff purchased beer from
a convenience store, consumed the beer, and subsequently leaped head-first into a
shallow pool. The plaintiff suffered severe spinal injuries and was paralyzed from the
neck down. In this case, the plaintiff was clearly negligent to some degree for
knowingly violating the law and causing his own injury. However, in cases where
the plaintiff has suffered terribly, the affirmative defenses authorized by the court are
less likely to be correctly employed by juries. Therefore, in cases involving
sympathetic plaintiffs, jury awards may not be consistent with fault. Therein lies the
danger in the new cause of action for minors.
While the practical effects of Busby appear to be primarily positive, the decision
does raise some interesting questions with regard to legal precedent and public
policy. The greatest difficulty will be reconciling the court's action with its ruling in
Todd. In Todd, the court refused to extend vendor liability protection to intoxicated
patrons who injured themselves as a result of their inebriated condition.'36 In
contrast, Busby extended liability to the almost analogous situation where a minor
voluntarily consumes alcohol and thereby injures himself.'37 This dichotomy might
not seem as significant if the two different infirmities were not jointly protected by
state law. Article 28, section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution makes it unlawful for

133. Id. at 1333.
134. Id. at 1334. If the conduct of the vendor is found to be willful, wanton, or intentional, then
fault must not be apportioned between the parties. Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc., 854 P.2d
910, 917 (Okla. 1993); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 361-63 (Okla. 1993).
135. 877 P.2d 1130 (Okla. 1994).
136. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508, 512 (Okla. 1991).
137. Busby, 885 P.2d at 1330.
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any liquor licensee to sell or furnish any alcoholic beverage to "a person under
twenty-one (21) years of age; or a person who has been adjudged insane or mentally
deficient; or a person who is intoxicated."' 38 The plain reading of this provision, as
noted by Justice Wil:3on in her dissent to Todd, is that minors and intoxicated adults
both are to be protected by the liquor licensee. 3 Thus, the court's willingness to
find a violation of such provisions to be negligence per se in the case of minorinebriates," but not in the case of adult-inebriates,' 4 ' might seem inconsistent.
Justice Wilson argued that the Constitutional provision should be interpreted to
include intoxicated persons within the protection of tort law.' The majority
disagreed, determining that the plaintiff in Todd was not within the class of persons
the statute or Constitution meant to protect. 43 Specifically, the Todd majority found
nothing in any of the statutes regulating the sale of alcohol which indicated legislative
intent to protect the intoxicated adult who, by his own action, caused injury to
himself."M Instead, it found only that the legislature intended to protect the45
"'unsuspecting public' - in effect all of the populace except the willing imbiber."'1
Finally, the Todd majority concluded that "Nowhere [in the Oklahoma Constitution,
article 28, section 5J do we perceive any design to alter the common law so as to
provide a civil remedy in tort for the adult imbiber against his barkeeper."'"
In addition to precluding recovery under negligence per se, the Todd majority
found that the alcohol vendor owed no duty to the adult imbiber who subsequently
injured himself'4 In reaching this conclusion, the Todd majority considered the
results within other jurisdictions, public policy concerns, personal accountability, and
the potential effects of its ruling. After reviewing this information, the Todd majority
cited with approval several cases concluding, "[A]s a matter of public policy drunken
persons who harm themselves are responsible for their4 condition, and should not
prevail either under a common law or statutory basis."' 1
By denying recovery to an adult-inebriate who injures himself, the Todd majority
fulfilled its self described purpose. "A court that creates, as in Brigance, a cause of
action based on public policy has a burden to responsibly chart the boundaries
beyond which the new cause of action does not serve the public, and should not be
the law."'49
In contrast to the Todd court's findings regarding adults, the Busby court found
that Oklahoma law was meant to protect minors from the illegal sale or service of

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

28, § 5,quoted inTodd, 813 P.2d at 524, 525 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
OKLA. CONST. art.
Todd, 813 P.2d at 524, 525 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
Busby, 885 P.2d at 1332.
Todd, 813 P.2d at 512.
Id.at 524, 525 (Wilson, J. dissenting).
Id.at 510.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at511.
Id.
Id.at 512.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol48/iss4/6

NOTES

1995]

alcohol."' Specifically, the Busby court determined that "the Legislature, recognizing the foreseeable danger to third parties and minors who injure themselves, [had]
taken specific steps to treat minors differently from adults by preventing minors from
consuming and possessing alcohol." '' Since the Busby court found, as a matter of
public policy, that minors were, as a class, incompetent to deal responsibly with, the
effects of alcohol, it concluded that the public had a right to demand that a
commercial vendor act more prudently and with a greater duty towards minors than
adults.'
Under these circumstances, the logic of the Oklahoma Supreme Court seems
appropriate. After all, most citizens would probably agree with the framework of
dram shop liability as it has been delineated. The difficulty is that the satisfactory
results are not consistent with the plain meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution and
Statutes.'53 Only by creative interpretation has the court carved out nonliability in
the case of adult consumers who injure themselves. In fact, the first time the
Oklahoma Supreme Court considered whether to extend Brigance to cover the facts
in Todd, the court found that state law clearly authorized such a cause of action.'
Only upon rehearing seven months later did the court determine that public policy
barred such actions.'55 Therefore, while the outcome seems reasonable, the
distinction between Todd and Busby lacks a firmly rooted foundation.
While there does not appear to be a significant problem of precedent, the decisions
in Busby and Mansfield, when read with Sanders and Tomlinson, suggest another area
of unresolved difficulty in Oklahoma dram shop law. Specifically, Busby and
Mansfield establish a cause of action for a minor who purchases or consumes alcohol
and injures himself. Sanders, on the other hand, suggests that alcohol purchased by
one minor and shared with others may not give rise to the same rights. Described
differently, if a minor friend of Mansfield had purchased the beer and provided it to
him, Sanders suggests that Mansfield would not have a valid negligence claim. This
raises the as yet unresolved question: To what extent is the vendor liable to minors
other than the one making the purchase? If the court were to follow the precedent

150. Busby, 885 P.2d at 1332.
151. Id. at 1331.
152. Id.at 1332.
153. See Todd, 813 P.2d at 523-26 (Lavender, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Wilson,
J.,
dissenting).
154. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd, 61 OKLA.B.J. 3016 (1990).

We likewise see no rational distinction for a rule that would impose a duty running in
favor of third parties while at the same time failing to recognize a duty in regard to the
patron himself. It would ignore the obvious for us to rule, as we did in Brigance, which
involved injury to a passenger riding with the intoxicated driver, that injury to third parties
traveling on our highways is foreseeable whereas injury to the consumer-inebriate driver
was not so foreseeable. It would also be counter to common sense and basic logic.
Further, although we do not rely on a statute or constitutional provision in ruling a
duty is owed, our decision does not place tavern owners under a greater duty than they
are already under by virtue of the Oklahoma Constitution and the statutes of this State.

Id. at 3018-19.
155. Todd,813 P.2d at 512.
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cited in Tomlinson,56 it would take a broad view of causation and allow injured
minors more flexibility to show causation. The difficulty therein is that such a result
would be somewhat inconsistent with Sanders.
V. Conclusion
The rule announced in Busby may not be entirely consistent with the holding from
Todd and other Oklahoma dram shop cases, but a close examination reveals that the
decisions can be consonant in Oklahoma law. Taken together with other Oklahoma
dram shop cases, they form a fair, relatively consistent, and substantially comprehensive set of rules governing commercial vendor liability. While the judicially
developed doctrine of vendor liability in Oklahoma is practical and probably

indicative of the system in many states, difficulties will continue to arise in this field
as long as the legislature abdicates its authority to regulate the conduct of alcohol

vendors and consumers. On significant issues of public policy, such as addressed in
dram shop cases, the public should expect elected officials to postulate the broad
policies, leaving the judiciary with more interpretive and less legislative authority.
For this reason, Oklahoma should strongly consider enacting dram shop legislation. "
Michael CraigAdkins

156. See Davis v. Billy's Con-Teena, Inc., 587 P.2d 75, 77 (Or. 1978); Munford, Inc. v. Peterson,
368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979); Matthews v. Konieczny, 527 A.2d 508 (Pa. 1987) (holding that "the duty
of adults engaged in serving alcoholic beverages extends beyond the minor to whom the liquor was
served; it also encompasses those who may be affected by the illegal service"); Anderson v. Moulder,
394 S.E.2d 61 (W. Va. 1990).
The question, then, becomes whether one who sells beer or alcoholic beverages to a minor
can ever reasonably foresee that the underage purchaser will share such beverages with
other minors, who will, in turn, become intoxicated and cause injury to themselves or
others. Other jurisdictions have concluded that in certain circumstances, such a result is
reasonably fore;eeable at the time of the unlawful sale. E.g., Morris v. Farley Enters.,
Inc., 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983); Floyd v. Bartley, 727 P.2d 1109 (Colo. 1986); Kvanli
v. Village of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 139 N.W.2d 275 (1965); Thompson v. Victor's
Liquor Store, Inc., 523 A.2d 269 (1987).
Anderson, 394 S.E.2d at 73.
157. For a similar conclusion, Melissa Kay Sawyer, Comment, Walking The Line ofLiquor Liability:
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Todd, 27 TuLSA L.J. 69 (1991).
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